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Abstract—Implementation attacks and more speciﬁcally Power
Analysis (PA) (the dominant type of side channel attack) and
fault injection (FA) attacks constitute a pragmatic hazard for
scalar multiplication, the main operation behind Elliptic Curve
Cryptography. There exists a wide variety of countermeasures
attempting to thwart such attacks that, however, few of them ex-
plore the potential of alternative number systems like the Residue
Number System (RNS). In this paper, we explore the potential
of RNS as an PA-FA countermeasure and propose an PA-FA
resistant scalar multiplication algorithm and provide an extensive
security analysis against the most effective PA-FA techniques. We
argue through a security analysis that combining traditional PA-
FA countermeasures with lightweight RNS countermeasures can
provide strong PA-FA resistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scalar multiplication (SM), the main mathematical opera-
tion behind Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is the target
of a broad range of possible PAs and FAs on ECC [11]
[15] of both horizontal and vertical nature [7]. RNS is an
arithmetic representation that is advantageous when it comes to
parallel arithmetic calculations and has considerable potentials
as an PA/FA countermeasure [2] [4] [19] [16]. However, RNS
has small adoption from the research community due to the
complexity of its arithmetic and the high number of employed
hardware resources to implement it. In RNS, a GF(p) number
is represented by a given moduli base (RNS base) consisting
of several base elements. Randomizing such base elements
once per SM or in every GF(p) multiplication during SM
can provide disassociation of secret information to physical
leakage. Unfortunately, RNS in an ECC implementation leads
to considerable computational complexity and hardware re-
sources [16].
In this paper, we introduce a SM algorithm that uses RNS
as an add-on PA-FA countermeasure that in comparison to
previous RNS proposals does not use redundant RNS modulo
as a FA countermeasure and adopts a well balanced use of the
”base permutation technique” (also known as leak resistant
arithmetic [2]) as an efﬁcient PA countermeasure. The level
of security that these approaches can offer, when speciﬁc
PA and FA attacks are applied to an ECC implementation,
is evaluated and a roadmap of RNS based countermeasures
is described. Extending the work of [16] we argue through
a security analysis that a combination of traditional PA/FA
countermeasures [10] [15] [12] and RNS based structures can
provide strong side-channel resistance.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section
II, RNS is introduced and its PA and FA resistance in ECC
systems is discussed. In section III, new RNS based PA-FA
algorithms are proposed. In section IV, a security analysis of
our proposal is made and section V concludes the paper.
II. RNS FOR EC POINT OPERATIONS
A number x can be represented in RNS as a set of n
moduli xi (x
RNS→ X : (x1, x2, ...xn)) of a given RNS
basis B : (m1,m2, ...mn) as long as 0 ≤ x < M where
M =
∏n
i=1mi is the RNS dynamic range and all mi are
pair-wise relatively prime. Each xi can be derived from x by
calculating xi = 〈x〉mi = x mod mi. Assuming that we have
two numbers a and d represented in RNS as A : (a1, a2, ...an)
and D : (d1, d2, ...dn), we can contain all arithmetic opera-
tions in RNS as A  D = (〈a1  d1〉m1 , ... 〈an  dn〉mn)
where  : (+,−,×)
Binary reconstruction from its RNS representation can be
done using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) x =〈∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M−1i
〉
mi
·Mi
〉
M
where Mi = Mmi and M
−1
i
is the multiplicative inverse of Mi. The required M modulo
reduction, due to the high bit length of M , is not efﬁciently
realized and is usually performed by introducing a correction
factor w as shown in x =
∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M−1i
〉
mi
·Mi − w ·M
To avoid the above process, x’s Mixed Radix System (MRS)
representation X˜ : (u1, u2, ...un) can be used for RNS to
binary conversion [3] [5].
For ECC approved ECs deﬁned over GF(p) (ECs on
GF (2k) are not discussed in this paper), all GF(p) operations
(addition, subtraction, multiplication) are modular operations
(modulo p). Performing RNS GF (p) addition or subtraction
can be easily realized by expressing p in RNS format i.e.
P : (p1, p2, p3, ...pn) and calculating for each moduli i〈〈ai ± di〉mi〉p1i
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However, RNS GF(p) multiplication is a computationally
difﬁcult operation. It is usually realized through the RNS
Montgomery multiplication algorithm that involves base exten-
sion operations [3] (increasing its complexity). Assuming that
we introduce two RNS bases Bn = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) and
B´n = (mn+1,mn+2, . . . ,m2n) such that gcd(mi,mj) = 1
for all i ∈ {1, n} and j ∈ {n+ 1, 2n}, we express a GF(p)
number x in base Bn or B´n as XB and XB´ respectively, while
in both RNS bases as XB∪B´ . We also deﬁne MB =
∏n
i=1mi
and M−1B as the multiplicative inverse of MB in base Bn, as
well as MB´ =
∏2n
i=n+1mi and M
−1
B´
as the multiplicative in-
verse ofMB´ in base B´n. The RNS Montgomery multiplication
(RNSMM) as an outcome calculates SB = A ·B ·M−1B modp
and SB´ = A ·B ·M−1B´ modp. Base extension from one base
to the other in RNSMM is needed, since M−1B does not exist
in base Bn and therefore computations must be migrated to
the B´n base to come up with SB .
In the ﬁrst step of RNSMM Base extension operation, the
base Bn RNS number is converted into a base Bn MRS
number. In the second step, the base Bn MRS number is
converted into a base B´n RNS number. A similar two step
procedure is followed for base extension from B´n to Bn
respectively to provide a correct RNSMM outcome.
Each RNS number A must be in the Montgomery for-
mat (AB · MB modPB or AB´ · MB´ modPB´). So, ini-
tially an RNSMM must be performed between A and
MB∪B´ modPB∪B´ using the bases Bn and B´n in reverse or-
der (i.e. RNSMM(A,MB∪B´ modPB∪B´ , P, B´n, Bn)). Mont-
gomery domain normalization can be removed through an
RNSMM of the Montgomery formatted RNS number A with
1. To increase computation efﬁciency, most studies on optimal
base moduli [5] agree that moduli of the form 2k ± ci,
2k−2ti±1 or 2k, 2k−1, 2k−1−1 2k+1−1 (Mersenne numbers)
for various i values provide high performance results.
A. Using RNS for PA and FA resistance
Bajard et al. in [2] proposes, originally for modular expo-
nentiation, a random permutation of the base Bn and B´n mod-
uli for PA resistance thus creating
(
2n
n
)
random permutations
of Bn and B´n. We denote each such RNS Base γ permutation
as Bn,γ and ´Bn,γ . The periodic change of a base permu-
tation during the modular exponentiation (and consecutively
SM) computation ﬂow can introduce enough randomness to
thwart PAs. This leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) technique
can be applied to modular exponentiation designs (used for
RSA) either by choosing a new base permutation once at the
beginning of each modular exponentiation or by changing a
permutation in each RNSMM operation of the exponentiation
process. The base transition of an RNS number A represented
in a base permutation γ to a new permutation γ´ can be done
by performing two consecutive RNSMMs. Initially A1 =
RNSMM(A,MB∪B´ mod PB∪B´ , P, B´n,γ´ , Bn,γ´)
1 is per-
1Note that A has the form A1 · M−1Bn,γ mod P since it is an output of
some previous RNSMM
formed and it is followed by RNSMM(A1, 1, P, ´Bn,γ , Bn,γ)
(Random Base Permutation operation, RBP)
Some attempts to introduce LRA in SM have been made
in [19], however, they are applicable only to the CRT type of
base extension using the Cox-Rower method when pseudo-
Mersenne numbers are used for base moduli. In SM, a
permutation transition can be done only once (per SM), in
every round of the SM process or before an GF (p) RNSMM
operation of each point operation of every round. Taking into
account that the transition from one permutation to another
costs 2 RNSMM, the third approach is not affordable in terms
of speed. The ﬁrst approach, providing a single randomization
per SM may be vulnerable to horizontal PA attacks (depending
on the employed implementation methodology) so the second
approach is the best option promising balance between perfor-
mance and PA resistance strength.
To achieve RNS based fault detection during RNSMM
[4], in the existing two RNS bases moduli Bn and B´n,
a redundant moduli mr is added, thus executing RNSMM
using redundant bases Bn ∪mr and B´n ∪mr. The redundant
RNSMM algorithm results SB∪mr and SB´∪mr include moduli
related to base element mr If no fault is injected during an
RNSMM then the 2 moduli must be the same. This approach
is capable of detecting a single fault during a RNSMM and
bares an additional performance cost (compared to the original
RNSMM) in the RNS Base extension operations. The tech-
nique is applied in [19] only to Cox-Rower RNSMM designs
(using CRT base extension method) and later is generalized
for base extension approach in [4].
III. FA AND PA RESISTANT SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
Given the description of RNS PA and FA countermeasures,
we propose the inclusion of LRA as an add-on countermeasure
in an PA resistant SM algorithm in order to provide horizontal
(eg. simple PAs) apart from vertical attacks resistance. In the
proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1), LRA is combined with the
base point blinding technique (additive randomization of the
EC base point V ) in the Montgomery Power Ladder (MPL)
algorithm (MPL is considered secure against most vertical and
horizontal attacks) expanding the work of [17] and [16].
In Algorithm 1, we introduce LRA RNS base randomization
once in each SM round (steps 4c and 4d) and in that way
manage to include a different randomization element in every
round. The input point V is initially blinded by adding to it a
random element R, thus preventing sophisticated, comparative
simple PAs [12]. MPL is a highly regular SM algorithm (it
always performs 2 point operations per round regardless of
the scalar bit ei) and also provides an intrinsic fault detection
mechanism based on the mathematical coherence of R0 and
R1. As observed in [20] and by Giraud in [18], the R0 and
R1 points in an MPL round always satisfy the equation R0 =
V + R1. Injecting a fault during computation in an R1 or
R0 variable will ruin this coherence and by introducing an
MPL coherence detection mechanism in the end of the MPL
algorithm, this fault will always be detected. This technique
is adopted in step 6 of Algorithm 1 where R0 + V 	= R1 if

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a fault is injected. Note that the correct result is unblinded
only after the fault detection mechanism, in order to provide
protection against possible bypassing (by injecting a second
fault) of the fault detection countermeasure.
Algorithm 1. LRA PA-FA Blinded MPL algorithm
Input: EC base point V , random point R ∈ EC(GF (p)), e =
(et−1, et−2, ...e0)
1. Choose random initial base permutation γt. Transform V, R to RNS format
using γt permutation
2. R0 = R, R1 = R+ V , R2 = −R
3. CMF (R0, R1, R2, ´Bn,γt , Bn,γt )
4. For i = t− 1 to 0
(a) R2 = 2R2,
(b) choose a random base permutation γi
(c) RBP (R0, Bn,γi+1 , B´n,γi+1 , Bn,γi , B´n,γi )
(d) RBP (R1, Bn,γi+1 , B´n,γi+1 , Bn,γi , B´n,γi )
(e) if ei = 1
R0 = R0 +R1 and R1 = 2R1
else
R1 = R0 +R1 and R0 = 2R0
end if
5. RBP (V,Bn,γt , B´n,γt , Bn,γ0 , B´n,γ0 )
6. If (i and e are not modiﬁed and R0 + V = R1)
then
(a) RBP (R0, Bn,γ0 , B´n,γ0 , Bn,γt , B´n,γt )
(b) return R0 +R2
else return error
Conversion to Montgomery Format (CMF) operation is used
for transforming all EC point coordinates into the Montgomery
format, so that RNSMM can be performed correctly. This
conversion will require 9 RNSMMs (all points are in projective
coordinate representation). The RBP function performs base
transformation from base permutation γ to permutation γ´ and
requires 6 RNSMMs. The RBP function is executed in each
MPL round once for point R0 and once for R1.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Power Analysis Attack Resistance
The approach of constant number and type of point op-
erations per round (being a vital part of MPL) proposed
in Algorithm 1 provides SPA protection. It can be further
enhanced through the use of elliptic curves with uniﬁed
formulas for addition and doubling like Edwards curves [8] or
the recent results from Renes et al. [23] proposing complete
addition formulas for every prime order short GF(p) based
Weierstrass curve (char(GF(p))	= 2, 3).
Regarding horizontal attacks that are focused on a single
collected trace decomposition in sample time blocks and anal-
ysis per block, Feix et al. presented in [13] a powerful attack
against blinded SM algorithms. This attack cannot be applied
in our implementation, because it requires collisions from
vertical attacks, when a dummy point addition is performed.
There are no dummy operations in our algorithm. For their
horizontal scenario, they ﬁnd leakage between doubling and
adding operations in two consecutive rounds; in our case the
random base point is involved in each round. The horizontal
attack of Bauer et al. [7] is based on splitting an element of
GF(p) in words and ﬁnding correlation between them. Since
those elements are represented in their RNS form, we expect
the corresponding correlations to reveal no useful information.
MPL is not resistant against reﬁned PA (RPA) or zero-value
point attacks (ZVP) even if applying randomization of the
projective coordinate by multiplying with a random number,
and applying EC or ﬁeld random isomorphisms [10]. How-
ever, in Algorithm 1, base point randomization is performed
additively (Base point blinding), so the above mentioned
attacks become unsuccessful. Using only RBP without base
point blinding would not sufﬁciently protect against ZVP
attacks. For comparative SPA attacks, MPL (and consecutively
Algorithm 1) is resistant to Doubling attack (DA) [14], but not
against relative DA (RDA) [24] or 2-Torsion Attack (2-TorA)
[25]. Base Point blinding, if applied statically (e.g. the same
random number is added in each round, BRIP method [21]),
cannot thwart RDA and 2-TorA [1]. However, in Algorithm 1,
the base point randomization is extended in every algorithmic
round. A different randomization number (a multiple of R)
is added an i round’s ki · V or (ki + 1) · V thus effectively
preventing RDA and 2-TorA.
In MPL like algorithms, an attacker can recover ei by
observing in which register (R0 or R1) the point addition
outcome is saved. This is not possible in Algorithm 1, since
in each round a non dummy value storage operation is done
in parallel to all registers thus masking a speciﬁc register
storage power trace (it can’t be discriminated from the rest).
Furthermore, since we are using RNS arithmetic, R0, R1 and
R2 consist of n different values each (one for each modulo).
Each value is stored in a different register that adds to the
complexity of discriminating the n storage operations of R1
from the n storage operations of R0.
Regarding DPA attacks, countermeasures are based on ran-
domization during the SM process [11] [10] as adopted in
Algorithm 1 (base point blinding, Coron second countermea-
sure). As long as point operations in SM rounds remain fully
balanced (same point operations number per round, same point
operations execution order per round for all rounds) and the
random point R is not a weak mask (i.e. a randomization
that can lead to unmasking (un-blinding) the point P in an
intermediate SM round), then base point blinding remains a
strong DPA countermeasure [11]. The above remark is true
for Algorithm 1 constituting our proposal DPA resistant. This
property is further ensured by the use of LRA and can be
enhanced by uniform group law based EC arithmetic. The
template attack of [22] is not successful in our scenario,
because it uses an ofﬂine DPA phase; since we use base point
blinding and RBP in each SM round, DPA cannot be applied.
For the same reason Online Templete Attacks [6] should be
also not possible, since point blinding makes the traces of mV
and (m+1)V look random (where m and m+1 are speciﬁc
values for scalar e).
B. Fault Analysis Attack Resistance
Algorithm 1 fault protection mechanism is focused on FAs
during SM, not aiming at weak curve attacks. This mechanism
consists of infective computation and fault detection, base


point blinding (randomization), LRA and RNS fault diffusion.
Infective computation is an inherited characteristic of the
Algorithm’s 1 adopted MPL and its main goal is to propagate
an injected fault through the SM process so that it will
be always detected by the fault detection mechanism. Fault
detection takes advantage of the MPL mathematical coherency
of R1−R0 = P for every SM round and evaluates this equality
at the end of calculations before removing randomization and
releasing the result. The fact that all operations are performed
in RNS, enhances SM fault diffusion. Due to the iterative
use of base extension functions in RNSMM (as part of each
point operation coordinate calculations) even a single fault
(eg. a single bit ﬂip on R0 or R1) will cause a change
in the whole RNS number (in all this number’s moduli).
The fault will propagate uncontrollably through Algorithm’s 1
execution thus considerably affecting all the computations and
will eventually be detected in the Algorithm’s 1 step 6 fault
detection mechanism thus avoiding the need for an additional,
redundant, RNS moduli to detect the fault during a single
RNSMM [2], [4].
C-safe error and sign change fault attacks do not apply
to the proposed approach since Algorithm 1 has no dummy
operations and does not use scalar Non-adjacent form (NAF).
The proposed approach is also protected against M-safe er-
ror attacks (usually successful against MPL) since the RNS
computations are performed in parallel and all bits stored in
RNS registers are computed concurrently. Thus, an M-safe
error attack will always alter the R0 or R1 outcome and
will be detected. Differential FAs like the Biehl-Meyer-Muller
attack [9] are not successful in the proposed scheme due to
the adopted fault detection mechanism which is also effective
against multiple fault injection during algorithmic execution.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced a new MPL algorithm based on the
combination of RNS and LRA arithmetic. Our proposal for
a random base permutation instead of exchanging between
two ﬁxed base extensions provides PA-FA resistance against a
wide range of such attacks. An PA-FA security analysis against
the most potent attacks proves our claim that the combination
of traditional PA-FA countermeasures with RNS arithmetic
inclusion can provide strong resistance against PA-FA attacks.
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